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Long Run Projections for Climate Change Scenarios 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The prediction of future temperature increases depends critically on the projections of future 
greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there is a vigorous debate about how these projections should 
be undertaken and how reasonable is the approach of the Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios (SRES) published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
which forms the basis of nearly all recent analyses of the impacts of climate change. In 
particular there has been significant criticism by Ian Castles and David Henderson regarding 
the plausibility of some scenarios.  
 
This paper explores a range of methodological issues surrounding projecting greenhouse 
emissions over the next century. It points out that understanding future emissions, requires a 
framework that deals with the sources of economic growth and allows for endogenous 
structural change. It also explores the role of “convergence” assumptions and the debate 
regarding the use of purchasing power parity (PPP) measurement versus market exchange 
rate (MER) measurement of income differentials. Using the G-Cubed multi-country model 
we show that emission projections based on convergence assumptions defined in MER terms, 
are 40% higher by 2100 than emissions generated using a PPP comparison of income 
differentials between economies. This result illustrates the argument by Castles and 
Henderson that the use of MER convergence assumptions will likely overestimate emissions 
projections, taking many other issues as given.  However it is not clear what this means for 
the SRES projections given that it might be argued that in some models in the SRES, there 
could be endogenous changes in technology that will offset this result. We do not have access 
to those models to explore this issue and can only show what this particular assumption 
implies in the G-Cubed model.  It is also ambiguous exactly what was done in the SRES 
report regarding convergence assumptions in some scenarios.   
 
Either way these results do not imply that climate change is not an issue but that there is a 
great deal of uncertainty about future climate projections and it is very unhelpful to presume 
that all futures are equally likely. In order to deal with this we also propose as a better guide 
to policymakers a methodology that calculates probabilities for future projections rather than 
the approach of SRES which is based on storylines without any assessment of plausibility. It 
is unfortunate that some analyses of the impacts of future climate change are based on the 
extreme outliers from the SRES without any understanding of the probability of these 
outcomes. This alternative approach could be done using the economic approach proposed in 
the G-Cubed model as outlined in this paper, or it could be done with the existing range of 
SRES scenarios to better inform the debate on likely future greenhouse scenarios. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Background 
 
Everyone wants accurate, or at the very least, understandable, projections of future 
climate change. While the need is clear, providing the projections is considerably more 
difficult. The crucial starting point for any climate projections are the projections of 
emissions of greenhouse gases, which themselves depend on the various human activities 
(mostly, but not entirely, energy related) that generate the emissions. While converting these 
emissions to temperature and climate change is the domain of atmospheric and 
meteorological sciences, generating the emission predictions is the domain of the sciences of 
human activity, most notably economics. 
Of the various attempts to generate emissions projections for input into climate 
models, the IPCCs Special Report on Emission Scenarios (IPCC 2000), or SRES, is probably 
the most comprehensive and visible, and as a result has attracted considerable critical analysis. 
Some of this critique focuses on the approach to uncertainty adopted by the SRES (see, for 
example, Schneider, 2001). Other aspects of the critique have focused on the apparently high 
economic growth rates in some of the scenarios and the ways in which this may have 
emerged (see Castles and Henderson, 2003a and 2003b). Indeed, of the many critiques of the 
SRES, the Castles and Henderson critique has generated considerable public attention 
through its subsequent publication in relatively popular media. 
 
It is important that these areas of critique are carefully examined and understood. It is 
also crucial that the broader methodological issues surrounding such projections are also 
clearly delineated. As the economics is the first link in a chain of analysis that leads to 
climate predictions, it is crucial that economists use the best possible analysis for their part of 
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the job. 
This paper sets out some of the methodological issues that arise when attempting to 
project emissions over the long time frames necessary for climate predictions. In particular, 
we are concerned with: 
• the analytical issues behind designing projections exercises; 
• understanding the sources of economic growth; 
• examining the role of the idea of ‘convergence’ in generating economic growth 
projections; 
• considering the role of ‘purchasing power parity’ (PPP), versus market exchange 
rates (MER) in understanding economic growth and implementing particular 
convergence models (the basis of the Castles and Henderson critique) 
• making suggestions about a fruitful approach to uncertainty when projecting 
emissions. 
 
Structure of the paper 
 
This paper covers a number of different areas of discussion. The overall logic of the 
discussion is illustrated in the following figure. There are two broad sets of issues in 
generating long term projections, the underlying basis for the projections and the treatment of 
uncertainty. Looking at the basis for projections, these could be done at an aggregate level or 
at a sectoral level. Our first concern is with discussion the importance of a sector basis for 
projections. 
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Long term projections
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Either aggregate or sectoral approaches could use a variety of source of underling 
drivers, trends other expectations and so on. One possibility is to use convergence as a way of 
generating projections. Our second concern is to discuss convergence issues. One of these 
issues is the starting point and the basis for comparisons in convergence models. One option 
is to use convergence of underlying productivity. Another option is to use real GDP per capita 
comparisons. If GDP is the basis, then a potential PPP issue arises. Our third concern is to 
discuss these PPP issues and their implications. 
Our fourth concern relates to the treatment of uncertainty in long run projections. 
While the SRES adopted a scenario approach, there are other alternatives which we briefly 
consider. 
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Overview of findings 
It is, of course, very difficult to predict the long run evolution of global economic 
growth. The task is made more difficult, particularly in the context of emissions projections, 
in that it is not just the rate of growth that matters, but the composition of that growth and its 
geographical location. It is for the same projected rate of aggregate economic growth over the 
coming century to be associated with a wide range of emissions profiles. The driver is not 
growth per se, but the sources of that growth. 
There are different methodologies for predicting future carbon emissions. One of the 
key issues in looking forward is how history is understood since this is critical to different 
views of how to project the future. Figure 11 shows the paths of real GDP (in domestic units), 
energy use (in BTU) and carbon emissions for the United States and Japan from 1965 to 1990 
plotted as an index equal to unity in 1965. A dominant feature of this figure is that emissions, 
energy use and real GDP tended to follow a common trend until 1972 (although in Japan 
emissions rise faster than economic growth before 1972). When the OPEC oil price shocks 
dramatically changed the price of energy in 1972, there was a shift in the relationship with 
GDP growth continuing on a slightly different trend but energy use and emissions rising 
much less quickly. How is this historical experience interpreted? Energy models, which 
dominate the long run projections literature, tend to represent this as autonomous energy 
efficiency improvements (AEEI)2. This is an increase in energy efficiency of roughly 1% per 
year. Economists on the other hand see this as structural change induced by changes in 
relative prices. To be sure there is also a change in technology induced by higher energy 
prices but this is not autonomous in a behavioral sense. In projecting forward it is critical how 
this historical experience is built into the projections. In our view it is not sufficient to 
attribute this change to AEEI, but rather to attempt to further decompose and understand it. 
                                             
1 Adapted from Figure 1 in Bagnoli et al (1996). 
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Figure 1: GDP, Energy and Emissions for US and Japan
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In this paper we set out the methodology for undertaking long run projections used in 
the G-Cubed multi-country economic model. We illustrate how different assumptions about 
economic growth at the individual sector level can have large implications for the economy 
wide economic growth and economy wide carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels. 
We compare this with the methodology followed by the models that produced the SRES 
scenarios for the IPCC. 
As part of our analysis we examine the magnitude of the consequences of the Castles 
and Henderson critique of the SRES by generating a baseline projection from the G-Cubed 
model based on our usual growth convergence assumptions using a PPP measure of initial 
gaps between countries. To explore whether the different assumptions about growth 
                                                                                                                                          
2 See Manne and Richels (1992) for an overview of the concept of AEEI. 
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projections make any difference to the emissions projections, we then regenerate these 
projections assuming MER based gap between economies. In G-Cubed, the difference in 
emission outcomes turns out to be substantial. If developing countries grow more quickly 
over a century (because the potential for ‘catch-up’ is larger in the MER case), then the 
income and expenditure of both developing countries and developed countries rise. This 
causes an increase in energy use and a rise in carbon emissions globally- not just in 
developing countries.  
We find that by 2050 the projection of emissions from fossil fuels use based on the 
MER measures of GDP gaps is 22% higher than our base projection (using PPP) and by 2100, 
projected emissions are 40% higher than baseline emissions. About half of the higher 
emissions are generated from countries that are classed as developing in 2002 and about half 
from industrial economies. These numbers are almost 3 times those found in Manne and 
Richels (2003) who undertake a similar exercise. There are a number of reasons for these 
differences, which are open to debate. We do not change assumptions about exogenous 
technological developments caused by higher growth except those generated by relative price 
changes. Others might argue that higher economic growth would lead to faster AEEI and 
therefore emissions change by less. This is an open question. We also have much greater 
international interdependence between countries through trade and capital flows than the 
Manne and Richels study. The greater the positive spillovers from growth in developing 
countries to growth in industrial countries the larger the emissions, taking all other things 
equal. 
Although the results we find are significant, they cannot be directly applied to the 
SRES approach. Firstly, it is not clear that the SRES actually based any or all of the 
projections in the study on a standard growth convergence model, despite spending 
considerable space summarizing that literature. In many of the models used in the SRES the 
entire economy is summarized by the exogenous path for GDP growth and emissions growth 
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is driven by technology. GDP plays a minor role except as the scale variable. Indeed it is 
likely that the projections of emissions in the SRES were undertaken by the modelers before 
the chapter on economic growth was even written, because the economics of growth doesn’t 
really play an important role given the underlying methodology of the models used.  
If the modelers in the SRES used market exchange rate GDP differentials but the rate 
of convergence from the PPP convergence models then there is a problem as argued by 
Castles and Henderson (2003a) and as we illustrate in this paper. If the SRES models used an 
MER based convergence model by adjusting the rate of convergence to be consistent with the 
MER approach then there is still a problem because there is no evidence of convergence of 
GDP per capita in MER terms. This is why the growth convergence literature that has been 
published since the development of PPP GDP data and does not use market exchange rates. 
Secondly there is also no evidence of convergence between MER and PPP exchange rates so 
in our opinion there is no way to go from a PPP convergence model to a MER convergence 
model.  
However, it may just be that the models did something completely different to what is 
suggested in the SRES report. One alternative that likely underlies some of the projections is 
that the concept of convergence is implemented by specifying a gap between $US incomes 
per capita at the start of the projection period and an arbitrary gap between $US incomes per 
capita at the end of the projection period. The problem with this approach is that it relies on 
the evolution of the real exchange rate between countries to be able to say anything about the 
underlying drivers of growth at the sectoral level within a country. Many of the models used 
do not have the real exchange rate modeled and therefore cannot back out the underlying 
drivers of growth within a country for driving real economic growth. Even this approach 
would suffer from the same critique that income gaps measured in $US at different points in 
time cannot be used to derive underlying economic growth.  
While it is possible that some of the SRES scenarios contain growth rates that are 
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higher than would be case if PPP had been used in comparing base GDP, it does not follow in 
these scenarios that lower GDP growth would translate to lower emissions. We illustrate in 
this paper that the relationship between emissions and GDP depends on the relative 
importance of various sources of growth. It is possible to have a model with growth drivers 
and parameters setting that result in GDP and emissions moving in opposite directions. 
Despite the debate on PPP versus market exchange rates and whether this affects the 
SRES predictions of future emissions profiles, there is a deeper debate that needs to be 
undertaken on the overall world view that drives the models underlying the SRES type 
exercises of predicting more than 100 years into the future. It is clear that there are alternative 
approaches (such as the sectoral approach of G-Cubed) of generating emission profiles. 
Given the inherent uncertainty of projecting the future clearly a suite of approaches should be 
considered in future work on projecting greenhouse emissions. There is enormous uncertainty 
over the likely path of emissions, let alone how this will impact on climate outcomes. The 
policy implications are that whatever is done should take this uncertainty fundamentally into 
consideration. 
 The PPP ‘controversy’ arises in the context of one particular approach to forecasting 
(the use of some notion of convergence). Even if this issue is resolved, there remains many 
more fundamental issues to be considered and discussed between modelers and policy makers. 
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2. Some Theoretical Considerations 
 
a. Source of Economic Growth3 
 To project growth, it is important to first understand the ultimate sources of growth. A 
considerable amount of work has been undertaken on growth theory in recent years, and our 
general understanding of the drivers of growth has improved considerably. 
 At an abstract level there are four sources of growth within an economy: (1) increases 
in the supply of labor, capital and other inputs; (2) increases in the quality of these inputs, (3) 
improvements in the way inputs are used (technical change); and (4) improvements in the 
way that inputs are allocated across industries.  For the world economy as a whole, a fifth 
source of growth is reallocation of inputs among countries.  The first three effects can be 
illustrated with a simple model.  Suppose an industry can be represented by the following 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
 )MH()EJ()LG()KF(A = Y )--(1tttttttttt
σγβσγβ −  
 
where: Yt is output at time t; Kt, Lt Et and Mt are inputs of capital, labor, energy and 
materials; β, γ and σ are parameters; At is a coefficient reflecting the overall level of 
productivity; and Ft, Gt, Jt and Ht coefficients capturing the quality of each input.4  This 
expression can be transformed into a relationship between growth rates by differentiating 
with respect to time and dividing through by Yt.  The result is shown below, where lower case 
variables represent the rates of growth of the corresponding upper case variables: 
                                             
3 This section draws heavily on Bagnoli, McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1996). 
4 Coefficients F, G, J and H could also be interpreted as biases in the pattern of technical change.  A more 
general specification would allow for both improvements in factor quality and biases in technical change.  
Empirically, it would be difficult to distinguish the two effects.  One approach would be to form a panel data set 
from time series data for a large number of industries and then estimate productivity growth rates imposing the 
restriction that biases be industry specific and improvements in factor quality be the same across industries. 
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Output growth will thus be a weighted sum of overall productivity growth (a), increases in 
the quantity of factors (k, l, e and m), and increases in factor quality (f, g, j and h).  The 
weights in the sum are parameters of the production function.5 
 A more general expression can be obtained by relaxing the assumption that the 
production function is Cobb-Douglas.  Suppose the production process may be represented 
by a constant returns to scale function Q which depends on the level of technology, A, and 
quality-adjusted inputs of capital, labor and materials: 
 
)M H  ,E J ,L G  ,K F  ,AQ( = Y tttttttttt  
 
If firms minimize costs taking prices as given it is straightforward to show that the rate of 
output growth will be given by: 
 
m)+(hS+ e)+(jS + l)+(gS + k)+(fS + aA
Q
Q
1 =y MELK



∂
∂  
 
where the first term on the right hand side is called the rate of total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth, and SK, SL, SE and SM are the shares of capital, labor energy and materials in total 
costs.  This expression is similar to the Cobb-Douglas case except that the weights in the sum 
are now cost shares instead of production function parameters.  In fact, the Cobb-Douglas 
function is a special case in which the cost share of each input can be shown to be equal to 
the corresponding parameter.  The main difference between the two expressions is that the 
general case is nonparametric: decomposition of the growth rate does not depend on 
estimates of production function parameters.  Moreover, observations of the rates of growth 
                                             
5 This is a generalization of Solow (1957).  For a survey of recent papers which use less restrictive production 
or cost functions, see Dewiert (1992).  Maddison (1987) presents a broad survey of the productivity literature.   
m)+)(h---(1+e)+(j+l)+(g+k)+(f + a =y σγβσγβ  
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of inputs and outputs cannot be used to estimate parameters of the production function since 
no parameters are identified.   For the purposes of analyzing growth, however, this is not a 
liability.6 
 As an empirical matter, decomposing output growth into its constituent pieces is a 
difficult task.  For many industries, measuring the rate of output growth y is fairly 
straightforward: the quantity produced in one year is compared to the quantity produced the 
previous year.  However, determining the source of the growth requires very careful 
accounting to measure the quality-adjusted rates of growth of factor inputs.  Any errors in 
measuring inputs will cause the rate of total factor productivity growth to be misstated.   
 It is worth emphasizing the last point: studies of the sources of growth use the equation 
above to determine total factor productivity growth (tfp) as a residual after accounting for 
other factors: 
 
m)+(hS - e)+(jS -l)+(gS - k)+(fS  -y  = aA
Q
Q
1 = tfp MELK



∂
∂  
 
Any error in the measurement of input growth rates will cause tfp to be measured incorrectly.  
Denison (1962), Christensen and Jorgenson (1969), and others have emphasized that careful 
accounting for quality adjusted growth of inputs leaves little residual growth to be attributed 
to improvements in total factor productivity. 
 Jorgenson (1988) has shown that for the economy as a whole there is also another 
potential source of growth: reallocation of resources between industries.  To see this, consider 
an economy with two sectors, X and Y.  If the overall productivity of labor in sector X is 
higher than it is in sector Y (say because of prior technical change), a shift in final demand 
from Y to X shifts primary factors from Y to X and will result in growth of total output.  This 
occurs even if there is no concurrent productivity growth in the individual sectors.  The effect 
is even more pronounced if the composition of demand shifts toward sectors which have 
                                             
6 This approach is due to the pioneering work of Denison and is sometimes called ‘growth accounting’. See 
Denison (1974, 1979, 1985) for much more refined examples of this style of analysis. 
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productivity growth rates that are higher than average. 
 Thus, in order to project the world economy over a number of decades into the future 
we would need underlying projections of each country’s labor force, capital stock, materials 
inputs, changes in factor quality and changes in product demand patterns.  Many of these will 
lead to changes in relative prices and thus change the structure of each region’s economy.  
Moreover, the evolution of each country’s capital stock will be an endogenous result of 
domestic and foreign investment decisions.  In order to combine all of these projections, 
capture the effects of relative price changes, and project the future path of the capital stock 
you need a disaggregated intertemporal general equilibrium model.  
 
b. Sources of emissions growth 
 The evolution of GDP will likely but not necessarily be related to the path of carbon 
emissions. Because energy use is both an input and output in the process of generating GDP, 
the path of energy use will be determined from the bottom up. GDP growth is determined by 
the path of input use and technology. Just having a view of aggregate GDP growth does not 
mean that carbon emissions are residually determined. Bagnoli, McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
(1996) shows how a given path of GDP for an economy can yield very different profiles of 
energy use and carbon emissions depending on the sources of growth behind GDP. 
 It is natural to an economist to form a global projection of GDP by projecting 
underlying sectoral productivity growth, efficiency improvements and population or labor 
force growth and then incorporate these into a model with endogenous decisions on other 
inputs such as energy use, materials use and capital accumulation to build up the economy 
wide projection for GDP growth. The emissions projection which accompany this growth 
projection are determined by the sectoral use of fossil fuels in energy generation that are the 
outcome of the decisions of firms and households. 
 
 
c. Convergence of Economic Growth Between Countries 
 
Ideally the projection of economic growth within countries would be determined 
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within the context of each country since as we have shown above the drivers of growth are 
many and varied. However because our understanding of technical change is incomplete, it is 
useful to incorporate as much of the observed empirical relationships between growth rates 
across countries as possible. One of these issues is the observation that various measures such 
as income per capita or technology in sectors across countries tend to “catch up” to the 
leading country. Thus although it is desirable to focus on the sources of growth within each 
country it is nonetheless important to take into account the issue of convergence across 
countries. This section examines the theoretical basis for assumptions of convergence in GDP 
per capita levels and provides a brief review of the empirical evidence on income 
convergence.   
Studies of convergence often distinguish between conditional and unconditional 
convergence. Conditional convergence refers to convergence that exists as long as certain 
characteristics across the sample remain the same.  Unconditional convergence does not 
require this restriction.  The concept of convergence itself is often defined in different ways.  
Defining convergence and using the appropriate concept is an important consideration in 
convergence studies.  
 
i. Neoclassical Growth Theory and Convergence 
 
The neoclassical growth models of Ramsey (1928) and Solow (1956) suggest that 
there is an inverse relationship between the growth rate of income or output per capita and the 
initial starting level (Sala-i-Martin, 1996a).  Sala-i-Martin and Barro (1992) argue that if 
countries are similar with respect to preferences and technology then poor countries tend to 
grow faster than rich countries and “there is a force that promotes convergence in levels of 
per capita product and income” (p224). 
Sala-i-Martin (1996a) uses a simple neoclassical growth model to show that the 
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speed of adjustment parameter, β, is positive.  The higher β the greater the response of the 
average growth rate to the difference between the initial level of output per effective labour 
unit and the steady state value.  The model implies conditional convergence in that for a 
given steady state, the growth rate is higher the lower the initial level of output per effective 
labour unit.  This type of convergence is often referred to as conditional β convergence. 
The neoclassical growth model does not predict unconditional convergence.  Poor 
countries are predicted to grow faster than rich countries only if they share the same steady 
state characteristics. 
The production function in neoclassical growth models is usually specified using 
‘effective labour units’.  In the application of neoclassical growth theory, however, 
differences between per capita and per effective labour unit specifications are usually ignored 
as are differences between output and income specifications.  
 
ii. Empirical Evidence on Convergence 
 
Empirical research on convergence has received considerable attention in the economic 
literature.  Most of this research is concerned with the distribution of income per capita 
(living standards) and, to a smaller extent, the distribution of output per worker or per hour 
worked (productivity).   
The literature is not uniform in its approach to convergence analysis and alternative 
measures of convergence have important implications for the definition of convergence and 
its existence.  Four broad approaches to convergence analysis can be identified in the 
literature: beta convergence, sigma convergence, time series (co-integration) analysis, and 
distributional analysis.  We provide a brief description of these alternative approaches below.  
Sala-i-Martin (2002) and Quah (1995a) also provide summaries of the alternative approaches 
to convergence analysis.   
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Beta convergence refers to the existence of a negative relationship between the 
growth rate of income per capita (or the variable of interest) and the initial level. That is, a 
situation where poor countries tend to grow faster than richer countries.  The implication is 
that poor countries will eventually ‘catch-up’ to the income levels of richer countries.  Papers 
by Sala-i-Martin (see, for example, 1996a, 1996b, 2002) and Sala-i-Martin and Barro (1991, 
1992) have been particularly influential.  In a series of papers they document a consistent and 
robust finding of conditional convergence across countries and unconditional convergence 
across regions within a country with a speed of convergence coefficient of 2 percent. Sala-i-
Martin concludes that “the estimated speeds of convergence are so surprisingly similar across 
data sets that we can use a mnemonic rule: economies converge at a speed of about two 
percent per year” (1996b, p1326).  As discussed above, the speed of adjustment coefficient, β, 
measures the speed at which countries converge to their steady state.  Only if countries 
converge to the same steady state does convergence across countries in an absolute or 
unconditional sense exist.  Whilst Sala-i-Martin and Barro find evidence of unconditional 
convergence across regions within a country, this type of analysis also imposes restrictions 
since it only examines regions within a country where steady states are likely to be similar.     
Sigma convergence refers to a reduction in the spread or dispersion of a data set over 
time.  Beta convergence is a necessary condition for sigma convergence, but it is not a 
sufficient one (Quah (1995a) and Sala-i-Martin (1996b) provide a formal algebraic derivation 
of this result).  Some researchers have argued the relative merits of the beta and sigma 
approaches to convergence analysis (see, for example, Quah (1995a)).  Sala-i-Martin, 
however, argues that “the two concepts examine interesting phenomena which are 
conceptually different … both concepts should be studied and applied empirically” (pp 1328-
1329, 1996b). 
The distributional approach to convergence analysis was developed in a series of 
papers by Quah (see 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1997, 2000).  Quah (1995a) argues that cross 
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sectional regression approaches to convergence analyse “only average behaviour” (p 15) and 
are uninformative on a distribution’s dynamics because they “only capture ‘representative’ 
economy dynamics” (p 16).  Quah argues that “to address questions of catch-up and 
convergence, one needs to model explicitly the dynamics of the entire cross-country 
distribution” (1995b, p1). He proposes a dynamic distributional approach to convergence 
analysis and applies his techniques to a number of alternative theoretical specifications.  
Quah’s approach has been influential because it has applications in a wide range of research 
areas (see Overman and Puga (2002) for an application to regional unemployment). 
The times series approach to convergence analysis is based on the assumption that forecasts 
of income differences converge to zero in expected value as the forecast horizon becomes 
arbitrarily long. If the differences between countries’ income per capita levels contains either 
a non zero mean or a unit root then the convergence condition is violated (Bernard and 
Durlauf, 1995, 1996). 
In general, there is little evidence for unconditional convergence of income per capita 
or productivity levels when a large cross section of countries is considered (see Sala-i-Martin 
(1996b) for β and σ convergence analyses, Quah (1995b) for a distributional analysis, and 
Bernard and Durlauf (1995) for a time series analysis). 
The evidence for alternative forms of conditional convergence is stronger (see Quah 
(1995b, 1997) and Sala-i-Martin (1995)), although there is considerable debate about the 
appropriate interpretation of these results.  
The neoclassical growth model predicts conditional (beta) convergence: initially poor 
countries will grow faster than initially rich ones assuming they are converging to the same 
steady state. In practice, countries differ in many respects including their levels of technology, 
propensities to save, and population growth rates (Sala-i-Martin, 1996a).  Whilst analyses of 
conditional β convergence may be useful in examining the speed at which countries converge 
to their steady states, they do not provide empirical support for a closure of the income gap: 
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“only if all countries converge to the same steady state does the prediction that poor 
economies should grow faster than rich ones holds true” (Sala-i-Martin, 1996a, p1027). 
Likewise, conditioning in distributional analyses of convergence (as undertaken by Quah 
(1997)) may be useful in understanding the distribution of income across countries but the 
sense in which convergence exists in these studies is restrictive. 
 Although the evidence in favor of unconditional income convergence across 
countries is weak, the analyses provide useful information that can be used in economic 
projections.  Empirical analyses of productivity convergence at the sectoral level are limited 
(see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Bernard and Jones (1996a, 1996b)) and the growth 
convergence literature gives some useful guidance for formulating projections of sectoral 
productivity growth. However it is critical to measure the initial gaps correctly. The rate of 
growth of either sectoral productivity or income per capita or whatever is assumed to 
converge across countries depends critically on this initial gap. This is because with a 
constant rate of closing of the gap, the larger the initial gap, the higher the rate of growth 
required to close to gap by the constant factor each year. Thus the way the initial gap is 
measured is fundamental. This is why there is a debate on the difference between PPP and 
MER measures of economic variables across countries. 
 
 
d. PPP versus Market Exchange Rates 
 
International comparisons of national income (and other aggregates) require that 
income levels across countries are expressed in a common unit.  The simplest way to convert 
income levels expressed in different currencies is to use exchange rates.  Exchange rate based 
conversions of international Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are easy to calculate and 
available from the OECD’s National Accounts (http://www.oecd.org) database and the World 
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Bank’s World Development Indicators (http://www.worldbank.org).  There are, however, a 
number of problems that arise with the use of exchange rates as conversion factors.  
Exchange rates reflect the relative purchasing powers over traded goods and services.  They 
may be useful for the comparison of domestically produced traded goods and services. They 
are not appropriate for the international comparison of volume measures that include 
production for domestic consumption, such as output and productivity.  The use of exchange 
rates in such situations leads to a traded sector bias.  Exchange rate conversions tend to 
understate the real incomes of poorer countries and overstate the degree of inequality 
between countries because they ignore the lower cost of living that is typically observed in 
poorer economies (Dowrick, 2001).  Furthermore, exchange rates are not solely determined 
by relative prices.  They are increasingly influenced by speculative capital movements and 
therefore expectations and, as a result, may be too volatile to be used reliably as conversion 
factors.  
Castles and Henderson (2003b) have strongly argued the case against the use of 
market exchange rates as conversion factors: 
“[Market exchange rate] valuations across countries, since they do not measure quantity 
differences, have no place in international comparisons of output or real expenditure, nor in 
constructing measures of the growth of output or real expenditure that extend across national 
boundaries” (p420)  
There is therefore a need for appropriate conversion factors that eliminate differences 
in price levels and allow reliable international volume comparisons of output. The most 
widely used conversions factors that attempt to account for price level differences are 
purchasing power parities (PPPs). PPPs are designed to only reflect differences in the volume 
of goods and services between countries.  The simplest and most well-known example of a 
PPP is the Economist’s Big Mac Index.  The Big Mac Index compares the price of a similar, if 
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not identical, good (a Big Mac hamburger) between countries. Consider the information 
published in April 2003 (http://www.economist.com). At this time, a Big Mac in the United 
States cost, on average, US$ 2.71. In Australia, the price was A$3.00.  The PPP for Big Macs 
between the United States and Australia was therefore 3.00/2.71 = 1.11. Exchange rates at the 
time suggest a conversion factor of 1.61.  Exchange rates do not provide an indication of the 
relative purchasing power over a wide range of goods and services.  
The main source for PPPs over a wide range of goods and services is the United 
Nations International Comparison Program (ICP) database.  The ICP was established in 1968 
as a joint venture of the UN and  the International Comparisons Unit of the University of 
Pennsylvania, with financial contributions from the Ford Foundation and the World Bank.  In 
1970 the comparison included just 10 countries, by 1993 country coverage had increased to 
118. The OECD, in collaboration with the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) 
has continued to collect price data to estimate PPPs in its member states and currently 
operates on a three-year cycle. Since 1993, the World Bank has assumed the role of global 
coordinator for the ICP in non-OECD countries. Through its Development Data Group the 
Bank coordinates ICP surveys and publishes global PPP data sets.  
The ICP 2003-2005 Round is currently being undertaken (see 
http://www.worldbank.com/data/icp/  for updates).   
The resources necessary to construct the ICP database are considerable and there 
have been significant funding and data collection problems.  The ICP recently argued that 
“data quality has been severely damaged by a lack of timeliness, continuity, consistency and 
reliability. Without a substantial increase in funding to tackle these problems the ICP will fail, 
undermining the accurate monitoring of progress towards development goals.” 
(http://www.worldbank.com/data/icp/pdf/ICPbrochure.pdf) 
Despite these issues, most researchers agree that the ICP estimates remain the best 
  
20
statistics available for volume comparisons at the disaggregated level (Dowrick, 2001).  
There remains considerable debate, however, over the appropriateness of alternative 
aggregate PPPs.  Aggregate PPPs refer to PPPs that have been aggregated to correspond to 
broad consumption headings and total GDP. The debate concerns the method by which these 
aggregate PPPs are calculated. We consider the two most popular aggregation methods, the 
Geary-Khamis (GK) method and the Elteto, Koves and Szulc (EKS) method, and briefly 
discuss some of the issues involved in constructing time series from PPP adjusted data. 
The Geary-Khamis (GK) method is used to calculate the aggregate volumes (real 
GDP and its expenditure categories) at constant international prices in the Penn World Tables 
(PWT) and is advocated by Maddison (1995, 2001).  
The GK method involves comparing each country to the characteristics of the overall 
group of countries.  International prices are constructed by taking a weighted average over all 
countries in the group, where the weights correspond to output shares. The GK international 
price reference vectors for N goods, pwi, and the corresponding Paasche PPPs for K countries, 
Pk, are calculated by solving the following system of N + K simultaneous equations:  
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The advantage of using the GK aggregation method is that it is additive. Because the GK 
method compares all countries using a single price vector, the quantity indices for GDP 
expenditure components will add to the quantity index for total GDP.  This property is 
extremely useful for comparisons at various levels of aggregation.  However, fixed or 
constant price indices, as constructed by the GK method, suffer from substitution bias: 
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“As relative prices change, utility maximizing agents substitute expenditure away from 
relatively more expensive goods towards relatively cheaper goods. Comparisons based on a 
single price vector ignore this fact.” (Hill, 2000, p151).  
Hill recognises that there is also a ‘producer’ substitution effect that works to offset 
this ‘consumer’ substitution effect but argues that “in practice, at least at the level of GDP, the 
consumer substitution effect always dominates the producer substitution effect … [which] is 
the reason why Laspeyres price and quantity indexes almost always exceed their Paasche 
counterparts.” (p 152) 
The tendency for substitution bias is often referred to as the Gerschenkron effect (see 
Gerschenkron (1951), Hill (2000)).  It implies that the GK method, and additive PPP methods 
in general, have a systematic tendency to overestimate the quantity index for countries whose 
relative prices differ substantially from the reference price vector.   
The GK method gives greater weight to the price vectors of larger countries when 
constructing the international reference price vector.  As a result, international prices largely 
reflect the prices in relatively rich countries (Nuxoll (1994) argues that the ICP international 
prices most closely resemble the prices of Hungary), the relative per capita income of poorer 
countries is overstated, and the degree of inequality tends to be understated. 
Hill (2000) examines the extent of substitution bias in the GK method by undertaking 
a comparison of bilateral GK indexes with corresponding Fisher indexes7.  Hill finds “clear 
evidence of substitution bias in the results of Geary-Khamis PPP based international 
comparisons. In some cases, the Geary-Khamis results underestimate per capita income 
differentials across countries by as much as a factor of two.” (p160) 
                                             
7   The Fisher index is a superlative index that closely approximates the underlying price and quantity 
index (Hill, 2000).The Fisher Index is not transitive, however, and is therefore not appropriate for 
multilateral comparisons. 
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Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) argue that GK measures (and constant price measures 
in general) are not only subject to substitution bias, but that they “do not allow a utility 
interpretation inasmuch as they can contradict the rankings given by the application of 
revealed preference tests” (p42).   
Dowrick (2001) argues that, although the GK method is successful in reducing the 
traded sector bias that results from exchange rate comparisons, the GK method imparts “a 
substantial degree of substitution bias. … [The] typical level of substitution bias in the GK 
measure … is around ten percentage points; in some cases the magnitude of the bilateral bias 
approaches fifty percentage points.” (p15) 
Furthermore, because the degree of substitution bias may be changing over time, 
analyses of convergence are also affected.  Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) examine the degree 
of substitution bias in quantity measures of GDP in 1980 and 1990.  They find that measures 
of convergence over the period 1980 to 1990 are significantly affected by the choice of 
aggregation method.  Additive measures (such as GK) are found to exhibit significant 
substitution bias, but the extent of bias decreased over the sample period, leading to the 
conclusion that “constant price measures systematically confuse the convergence of true GDP 
with the convergence of prices” (p 62). As a result, convergence analyses based on additive 
measures tend to understate the extent of true quantity convergence when the reference price 
vector reflects the prices of relatively rich countries.  
The cross-country sample used in Dowrick and Quiggin is restricted to 17 OECD 
countries and, as such, the results on convergence need to be interpreted within the context of 
their sample selection.  Nevertheless, the important finding that convergence results are 
affected by the choice of aggregation method has important implications for empirical 
convergence analyses based on broader samples.   
The OECD provides PPP estimates for GDP and various final expenditure 
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components calculated using the Elteto, Koves and Szulc (EKS) method (OECD, 1993).  
Following the procedure of the PWT, the OECD originally used the GK method of 
aggregation.  In 1993, in recognition of the existence of Gerschenkron effects in GK PPP 
estimates, the OECD began using the EKS method to obtain PPPs for expenditure 
components and GDP and they continue to publish limited GK results. 
The EKS method involves taking the geometric mean of bilateral Fisher price 
indexes and is free from the type of substitution bias suffered by the GK method (Hill, 2000). 
The EKS price index for country k is calculated as (Hill, 2000): 
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The choice between alternative conversion approaches is far from clear. The literature 
survey presented above suggests that the GK method suffers extensively from substitution 
bias. Because of the existence of the Gerschenkron effect, the OECD considers EKS results 
appropriate “for comparisons across countries of the price and volume structures of 
individual aggregates such as … GDP” (OECD, 1993, p4).  The EKS method is the “main 
method used by the OECD-Eurostat PPP Programme” (OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/faq/0,2583,en_2649_34357_1799281_1_1_1_1,00.html#1799267) 
  
24
EKS results, however, are not additive. The property of additivity is desirable when 
the analysis of various expenditure components is required and the OECD states that “GK 
results are considered to be better suited to the analysis of price and volume structures across 
countries” (OECD, 1993, p4).   
 Maddison (1995) prefers GK results for all comparisons including those involving 
aggregates such as GDP.  As discussed above, the GK method weights countries according to 
their output shares, whereas the EKS method involves equal country weights.  Maddison 
states: “I see no point in equi-country weighting systems which treat Luxemburg and the 
USA as equal partners in the world economy, so I have a strong preference for the Geary-
Khamis approach” (Maddison, 1995). 
Despite the debate over aggregation methods, PPPs are regarded as the preferred 
conversion factor for international comparisons of output and productivity. The United 
Nations System of Nations Accounts (1993) explicitly states that 
“When the objective is to compare the volumes of goods or services produced or consumed 
per head, data in national currencies must be converted into a common currency by means of 
purchasing power parities and not exchange rates. It is well known that, in general, neither 
market nor fixed exchange rates reflect the relative internal purchasing powers of different 
currencies. When exchange rates are used to convert GDP, or other statistics, into a common 
currency the prices at which goods and services in high-income countries are valued tend to 
be higher than in low-income countries, thus exaggerating the differences in real incomes 
between them. Exchange rate converted data must not, therefore, be interpreted as measures 
of the relative volumes of goods and services concerned.” 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/sna1993/toctop.asp) 
The preference for PPPs over exchange rates applies to comparisons of output levels 
and to comparisons of growth rates where conversion factors are required. For economic 
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growth comparisons between countries, domestic growth rates (based on real GDP in 
domestic currencies rather PPP adjusted GDP) are appropriate and recommended by the 
OECD (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/27/1961296.pdf).  Growth comparisons between 
regions, however, require a weighting system and PPPs are the most appropriate conversion 
factor for the output weights: “measuring the growth of output in a number of countries 
grouped together, or across the world as a whole, the appropriate country weights – the 
measures of comparative real size of these different economies in some agreed base period – 
are PPP-based values” (Castles and Henderson, 2003b, p418).   
Growth rate comparisons are an important concern when constructing time series 
based on PPP adjusted data.  ICP data is only available for ‘benchmark’ years.  GDP time 
series are usually created by using a combination of ICP data and national accounts growth 
rates (see Hill (2003) for a survey of alternative methods).  An important property of the 
resulting time series is that the PPP GDP growth rates are consistent with country national 
accounts growth rates. The benchmark data used in the PWT is modified to ensure 
consistency but Hesten, Summers and Aten (2001) argue that the procedure is difficult to 
implement and suggest that the spanning tree approach proposed by Hill (2003) (which 
involves chaining bilateral comparisons) may provide a useful alternative.  They describe 
how the spanning tree approach could be used in the PWT and promote this as “a priority 
area of research” (p100).    
In Table 1 we highlight some of the issues discussed above with illustrative examples. 
Table 1 illustrates the effects of using alternative aggregation methods.  While the 
GK and EKS methods give different results, they are much closer to each other than they are 
to market exchange rate conversions. Thus despite the aggregation issue, the use of PPP 
however constructed gives a much better picture of the underlying income difference than the 
market exchange rate measure. 
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Table 1: Alternative Conversion Factors 
  Conversion Factor 
  Ratio to United States Ratio to EKS 
  Exchange 
Rate 
EKS GK Exchange 
Rate 
GK 
Belgium 0.86 0.80 0.82 0.96 1.00 
Denmark 1.07 0.79 0.84 1.20 1.03 
France 0.90 0.77 0.81 1.03 1.01 
Germany 0.97 0.76 0.78 1.13 0.99 
Greece 0.36 0.44 0.49 0.71 1.08 
Ireland 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.85 1.01 
Italy 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.86 0.99 
Luxembourg 1.29 1.13 1.15 1.02 0.99 
Netherlands 0.83 0.72 0.76 1.02 1.03 
Portugal 0.35 0.49 0.55 0.64 1.10 
Spain 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.81 1.01 
United Kingdom 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.85 0.98 
Austria 0.94 0.79 0.79 1.06 0.98 
Finland 0.68 0.64 0.67 0.94 1.02 
Sweden 0.87 0.69 0.71 1.12 0.99 
Switzerland 1.37 0.95 0.99 1.28 1.01 
Iceland 0.95 0.77 0.81 1.09 1.02 
Norway 0.99 0.78 0.86 1.11 1.06 
Turkey 0.12 0.22 0.26 0.48 1.13 
Australia 0.66 0.71 0.74 0.81 1.01 
New Zealand 0.52 0.64 0.65 0.72 0.99 
Japan 1.38 0.83 0.90 1.47 1.05 
 
GDP 
Per 
Capita 
($US) 
 
Canada 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.87 1.00 
Source: OECD (1993), Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures, Volumes I and II 
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e. Conversion Factors and Income Convergence Assumptions 
The choice between using market exchange rates or PPPs to convert GDP clearly has 
a significant impact on international income level and growth comparisons.  How and why 
this might affect projections of future emission levels depends on the assumptions that 
underlie the projection model.  If income convergence assumptions are an important 
determinant of economic growth rates, as they appear to be in the SRES scenario families A1 
and B1 (summarized below), then accurately measuring the income gap becomes an 
important consideration.  
The rate of growth in a convergence model will be determined by the size of the 
initial gap, the rate of change of the frontier, and the assumed degree of convergence. 
In looking at arguments for and against the use of PPP exchange rates when making 
inter-country comparisons, this is a tendency to confuse PPP the hypothesis (that price 
bundles across countries will tend to equalise) with PPP the empirical technique (in which the 
value of an equivalent bundle of goods is compared across countries) such as in Manne and 
Richels (2003). These are very different concepts and it is unfortunate that they have the 
same name. If the hypothesis of PPP held, then there would be no issue in the use of either 
PPP or MER exchange rates in developing some form of convergence model, because there 
would be a unique relationship between relative prices and the exchange rate between 
countries. 
 
As we have illustrated, empirical comparisons of prices show convincingly that the 
hypothesis of one price does not hold over the history of the last 50 years or so. That is, PPP 
exchange rates and market exchange rates are not the same. Further there is no observed 
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tendency for these to move in any systematic way relative to each other and more particularly 
there is no evidence that they tend to converge over time. Sure it is possible to construct a 
model where there is a relationship between PPP and MER holds and assume that one can 
always be converted easily into the other so that it can be seen purely as a “numeraire choice”. 
But that doesn’t mean it is a useful assumption to base real world analysis on.   
Because the hypothesis of PPP does not hold in any current data set, there can be no 
empirical basis for using it as an assumption in constructing a model of the evolution of 
prices and quantities. In particular, the fact that PPP and MER estimates can be significantly 
different for some countries over time means that the choice of the appropriate exchange rate 
(PPP or MER) at the starting point matters. It also matters over time because if there is no 
systematic relationship between MER and PPP exchange rates then they can’t lead you to the 
same point at some arbitrary point in the future. For example, the appreciation of the US 
dollar between 1982 and 1985 by 50% in real and nominal terms shows that neither the real 
or nominal exchange rates during this period were useful in comparing the relative size of the 
US and European economies. A convergence model starting in 1982 would clearly lead to a 
very different world in 2050 than a model starting in 1985.  
Now consider the argument that it is perfectly reasonable to specify a scenario defined as 
some relationship in MER terms between the incomes of industrialized economies and 
developing countries at some point in the future. If there is an underlying convergence of 
income measured in PPP terms but there is no relationship between PPP and MER then there 
can be an infinite number of growth paths in MER terms between now and 2100 including 
perhaps one in which there is no convergence because of a trend in the MER. You can of 
course assume that there is a relationship between PPP and MER and make the problem 
disappear but without anything but wishful thinking as a basis. 
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3. The G-Cubed Approach to Long Run Projections 
 
a. The G-Cubed Model 
 
The G-Cubed model outlined in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999), is ideal for undertaking 
global projections having detailed country coverage, sectoral disaggregation and rich links 
between countries through goods and asset markets. A number of studies—summarized in 
McKibbin and Vines (2000)—show that the G-cubed model has been useful in assessing a 
range of issues across a number of countries since the mid-1980s.8  A summary of the model 
coverage is presented in Table 2. Some of the principal features of the model are as follows: 
 
● The model is based on explicit intertemporal optimization by the agents (consumers 
and firms) in each economy9. In contrast to static CGE models, time and dynamics are of 
fundamental importance in the G-Cubed model.  
 
● In order to track the macro time series, however, the behavior of agents is 
modified to allow for short run deviations from optimal behavior either due to myopia or to 
restrictions on the ability of households and firms to borrow at the risk free bond rate on 
government debt. For both households and firms, deviations from intertemporal optimizing 
behavior take the form of rules of thumb, which are consistent with an optimizing agent that 
does not update predictions based on new information about future events. These rules of 
thumb are chosen to generate the same steady state behavior as optimizing agents so that in 
the long run there is only a single intertemporal optimizing equilibrium of the model. In the 
short run, actual behavior is assumed to be a weighted average of the optimizing and the rule  
                                             
8 These issues include: Reaganomics in the 1980s; German Unification in the early 1990s; fiscal consolidation 
in Europe in the mid-1990s; the formation of NAFTA; the Asian crisis; and the productivity boom in the US. 
9 See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
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Table 2: Overview of the G-Cubed Model 
 
Regions 
 
 United States 
 Japan 
 Australia 
Canada 
New Zealand 
 Europe 
 Rest of the OECD 
 China 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Rest of Latin America 
 Oil Exporting Developing Countries 
 Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
 Other Developing Countries 
 
Sectors 
 
Energy: 
 (1) Electric Utilities 
 (2) Gas Utilities 
 (3) Petroleum Refining 
 (4) Coal Mining 
 (5) Crude Oil and Gas Extraction 
 
Non-Energy: 
 (6) Mining 
 (7) Agriculture, Fishing and Hunting 
 (8) Forestry/ Wood Products 
 (9) Durable Manufacturing 
 (10) Non-Durable Manufacturing 
 (11) Transportation 
 (12) Services 
(Y) Capital Good Producing Sector  
 
 
of thumb assumptions. Thus aggregate consumption is a weighted average of consumption 
based on wealth (current asset valuation and expected future after tax labor income) and 
consumption based on current disposable income. Similarly, aggregate investment is a 
weighted average of investment based on Tobin’s q (a market valuation of the expected future 
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change in the marginal product of capital relative to the cost) and investment based on a 
backward looking version of Q. 
 
● There is an explicit treatment of the holding of financial assets, including money. 
Money is introduced into the model through a restriction that households require money to 
purchase goods.  
 
● The model also allows for short run nominal wage rigidity (by different degrees in 
different countries) and therefore allows for significant periods of unemployment depending 
on the labor market institutions in each country. This assumption, when taken together with 
the explicit role for money, is what gives the model its “macroeconomic” characteristics. 
(Here again the model's assumptions differ from the standard market clearing assumption in 
most CGE models.)  
 
● The model distinguishes between the stickiness of physical capital within sectors and 
within countries and the flexibility of financial capital, which immediately flows to where 
expected returns are highest. This important distinction leads to a critical difference between 
the quantity of physical capital that is available at any time to produce goods and services, 
and the valuation of that capital as a result of decisions about the allocation of financial 
capital. 
As a result of this structure, the G-Cubed model contains rich dynamic behavior, 
driven on the one hand by asset accumulation and, on the other by wage adjustment to a  
neoclassical steady state. It embodies a wide range of assumptions about individual behavior 
and empirical regularities in a general equilibrium framework. The interdependencies are 
solved out using a computer algorithm that solves for the rational expectations equilibrium of 
the global economy. It is important to stress that the term ‘general equilibrium’ is used to 
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signify that as many interactions as possible are captured, not that all economies are in a full 
market clearing equilibrium at each point in time. Although it is assumed that market forces 
eventually drive the world economy to a neoclassical steady state growth equilibrium, 
unemployment does emerge for long periods due to wage stickiness, to an extent that differs 
between countries due to differences in labor market institutions. 
 
b. The G-Cubed Projection Approach 
 
As with the growth accounting framework outlined in section 2, the assumptions 
about the inputs into growth projections are from the fundamental sources of growth in the G-
Cubed approach. There are two key inputs into the growth rate of each sector. The first is the 
economy wide population projection. The second is the sectoral productivity growth rate. In 
Bagnoli et al (1996) we modeled economy wide productivity and then used the historical 
experience of differential growth across sectors to apportion the aggregate productivity 
projections to each sector within an economy. 
We now assume that each sector in the US will have a particular rate of productivity 
growth over the next century. We then assume that each equivalent sector in each other 
country will catch up to the US sector in terms of productivity, closing the gap by 2% per 
year. The initial gaps are therefore critical for the subsequent sectoral productivity growth 
rate. We follow a two step process in determining the initial size of the gap. The first step is 
to specify the gap between all sectors and the US sectors equal to the gap between aggregate 
PPP GDP per capita between each country and the US. We can’t easily use sectoral PPP gap 
measures because these are difficult to get in a consistent manner and with a wide enough 
coverage for our purposes. Thus the initial benchmark is based on the same gap for each 
sector as the initial gap for the economy as a whole. If we then have evidence that a particular 
sector is likely to be closer to or further away from the US sectors than the aggregate 
numbers suggest, we adjust the initial sectoral gaps attempting to keep the aggregate gaps 
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consistent with the GDP per capita gaps. We then assume that productivity growth in each 
sector closes the gap between that sector and the equivalent US sector by 2% per year. The 
productivity growth is calculated exogenously to the model. We then overlay this productivity 
growth model with exogenous assumptions about population growth for each country to 
generate two of the main sources of economic growth. 
Given these exogenous inputs for sectoral productivity growth and population growth, 
we then solve the model with the other drivers of growth, capital accumulation, sectoral 
demand for other inputs of energy and materials all endogenously determined. Critical to the 
nature and scale of growth across countries are these assumption plus the underlying 
assumptions that financial capital flows to where the return is highest, physical capital is 
sector specific in the short run, labor can flow freely across sectors within a country but not 
between countries and that international trade in goods and financial capital is possible 
subject to existing tax structures and trade restrictions. 
Thus the economic growth of any particular country is not completely determined by 
the exogenous inputs in that country since all countries are linked through goods and asset 
markets.  
Carbon emissions are determined in the model by the amount of fossil fuels (coal, oil, 
natural gas) that are consumed within each country in each period. These primary factors are 
endowed within countries but can also be traded internationally subject to transportation costs 
(captured implicitly through the elasticities of substitution between each good in the model). 
Thus economic growth can occur within a country, without any particular pattern implied for 
energy use. The pattern on energy use will be dependent on the underlying inputs into the 
growth process. The illustration in figure 1 of the change in energy use relative to GDP after 
the oil price shocks of the early 1970’s would be explained in this approach by a substitution 
away from energy into the other inputs of capital and labor. This could be achieved both 
within sectors as well as by changing the composition of sectors in aggregate GDP with 
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services (less energy intensive) becoming a larger share of the economy than energy intensive 
manufacturing sectors. There can also be some technological change that is part of this story. 
In order to illustrate the importance of sectoral productivity growth figures 2 through 
5 show the patterns of GDP growth and emission of carbon when we change assumptions 
about productivity growth at the sectoral level. We change productivity growth in each sector, 
on a sector by sector basis, by 1% per year for 50 years. Each figure contains 13 groups of 
two bars. Each group along the horizontal access is the sector in which the increase in 
productivity growth occurs. Sector Y at the end of the chart is the sector that produces capital 
goods. In figure 2 we show the percentage deviation of both emissions and GDP as a result of 
the productivity growth in sector i. For example, if sector 9 (durable manufacturing) 
experiences more rapid productivity growth we see that by 2020, GDP will be approximately 
1.1% higher than otherwise and emissions will be 1% higher. Yet in sector 10 (non-durable 
manufacturing) we see that real GDP will be 0.5% higher but emissions will be lower. This 
occurs because producers substitute away from energy use in sector 10 when productivity 
rises. We see that in the services sector (sector 12) there is almost double the GDP impact 
relative to the increase in emissions.  In each of the energy sectors (1 to 5) higher productivity 
growth has almost no impact on GDP yet leads to significant increases in economy wide 
emissions. This is not because of emissions from those sectors, but because productivity 
growth reduces the relative price of these sectors output (i.e. various forms of energy) which 
causes other sectors and final demand to substitute into energy and thus raise emissions. 
Figure 3 shows the results for the same sectors for the same shocks but with results in 
2050 rather than 2020. It is interesting that the ratios of GDP to the change in emissions 
moves around between 2020 and 2050. This partly reflects the way in which higher wealth 
generated by productivity growth in some sectors leads to changes in spending patterns 
across the economy which changes overall emissions.  
 Figures 4 and 5 show the same style of results but this time for China as a result of 
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changes in US productivity growth by sector. This demonstrates the spillovers from growth in 
the US to growth and emissions in a developing country. It is interesting that although the US 
experienced 4 % higher GDP by 2020 as a results of productivity growth in sector 12 
(services), this spills over to China as a rise in GDP of 0.6% by 2020. This illustrates the 
importance of international linkages in the G-Cubed model. Secondly notice that the increase 
in emissions is much larger (1%) in China relative to the GDP increase. This partly reflects 
the higher emission coefficients in China as well as the higher growth from the US being into 
higher expenditure on higher energy intensive products in China (less on services and more 
on energy and energy intensive manufacturing).  Note that the spillover of growth in the US 
in the capital producing good (sector Y) to China is negative. This is because capital flows 
into the US away from China as the cost of capital goods fall in the US. Therefore both GDP 
and emissions falls in China for this particular type of productivity growth. 
 
Figure 2: Percentage Change in US Emissions and Real GDP by 2020
For a 1 percent rise in US sector i productivity growth
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Figure 3: Percentage Change in US Emissions and Real GDP by 2050
For a 1 percent rise in US sector i productivity growth
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Figure 4: Percentage Change in China Emissions and Real GDP by 2020
For a 1 percent rise in US sector i productivity growth
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Figure 5: Percentage Change in China Emissions and Real GDP by 2050
For a 1 percent rise in US sector i productivity growth
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 These various results clearly show that there is no simple relationship between GDP 
and emissions when the fundamental drivers of growth are taken into account, and when the 
full range of economic interactions between regions is allowed (both trade and capital flows). 
This shows the importance of getting at the fundamental drivers of economic growth 
(productivity or technical change, along with population) rather than using an aggregate 
proxy, such as GDP. 
 It is important to note that in the default approach used in the G-Cubed model, the 
initial gaps between countries are calibrated using initial real income comparisons between 
the US and other regions. These real income comparisons need to reflect the quantity of 
production and so to make the comparison we use PPP and not market exchange rates for the 
reasons outlined above. This is clearly the theoretically correct approach when using G-
Cubed. This form of calibration, however, is not fundamental to our approach but is the result 
of data availability and convenience. 
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 It is interesting to note that the G-Cubed model has a ‘PPP issue’ because of the 
particular default approach we take to our convergence model. This is not, however, a 
fundamental feature of G-Cubed itself. Indeed, PPP issues do not arise elsewhere in the 
model, because as a well specified economic model G-Cubed tracks relative prices and 
quantities and tells a detailed story about nominal and real exchange rates. 
 Another challenge in the G-Cubed approach is defining which country is on the 
frontier. We use the US in our default approach, but we could easily adjust this assumption 
for particular sectors as empirical evidence became available. 
 
 
 
4. The IPCC SRES Projection Approach 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the emission projections documented in the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
(SRES) (2002). The IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) and the United Nation’s Environmental Program (UNEP) to “assess the scientific, 
technical and socio-economic information relevant for the understanding of human-induced 
climate change” (IPCC, 2000). The SRES developed a range of emission scenarios that were 
designed to provide “input for evaluating climatic and environmental consequences of future 
greenhouse gas emissions and for assessing alternative mitigation adaptation strategies” 
(IPCC, 2000).   
The report covers four regions: OECD90 (all countries that belonged to the Organization 
of Economic Development (OECD) as of 1990), REF (countries undergoing economic 
reform - East European countries and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet 
Union), ASIA (all developing countries in Asia) and ALM (developing countries in Africa, 
Latin America and the Middle East). OECD90 corresponds to UNFCC (1992) Annex II 
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countries. REF includes non Annex II, Annex I countries.  OECD90 and REF are categorised 
as industrialised regions (IND) and ASIA and ALM are categorised as developing (DEV).  
The SRES highlights the interdependency between what they regard as the major 
driving forces of future emissions. According to the SRES, the main driving forces of future 
greenhouse gas trajectories are “demographic change, social and economic development, and 
the rate and direction of technological change” (2000, p5). 
To represent a range of driving forces and resultant emissions the SRES considers 
four “qualitative storylines” called “families”: A1, A2, B1, and B2.  From these four families, 
40 alternative scenarios are developed in 6 scenario groups.  Each scenario group has an 
illustrative scenario (6) and each family has a marker scenario (4).  This structure is 
illustrated in Figure 6.  
The SRES scenarios were designed to “cover a wide spectrum of alterative futures to 
reflect relevant uncertainties and knowledge gaps” (2000, p24) and to “cover as much as 
possible of the range of major underlying ‘driving forces’ of emissions scenarios” (2000, p24).   
The A1 storyline includes “very rapid economic growth, global population that 
peaks in the mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more 
efficient technologies” (SRES, 2000, p4).  Economic convergence among regions is a major 
underlying theme of the scenario family.  The three scenario groups in the A1 family are 
differentiated by their technological emphasis: fossil fuel intensive (A1F1), non-fossil energy 
sources (A1T), or a balance across sources (A1B). 
The A2 storyline describes “regionally orientated” economic development and 
relatively slow economic growth per capita and technological change (compared with the 
other storylines).  “The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of local identities” 
(SRES, 2000, p5). 
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The B1 storyline describes “a convergent world” (“efforts to achieve equitable 
income distribution are effective” (SRES, 2000, p182)) with a population structure as in the 
A1 storyline, “but with rapid changes in economic structures towards a service and 
information economy, with reductions in material intensity, and the introduction of clean and 
resource-efficient technologies” (SRES, 2000, p5).  There is an emphasis on “global 
solutions” and “improved equity”. 
The B2 storyline emphases “local solutions”, continuously increasing population (at 
  
41
a rate lower than in the A2 storyline), “intermediate” levels of economic growth and “less 
rapid and more diverse technological change than in the B1 and A1 storylines” (SRES, 2000, 
p5). 
Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate the range of global annual CO2 emissions and 
cumulative CO2 emissions for each of the SRES storylines. It is important to recognise that 
although the emission projections documented in the SRES include environmental policies, 
they do not include “explicit policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions or to adapt to the 
expected global climate change” (2000 p172).  They therefore represent outcomes in the 
absence of direct climate change policies. 
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Source: IPCC (2000) Appendix VII. Marker Scenarios shown as solid lines
Figure 8: Total Global Cumulative CO2 Emissions
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Cumulative SRES carbon emissions range from 800 GtC (gigatonnes of carbon) to 
over 2500 GtC with a median of about 1500 GtC.   
The SRES highlights the finding that scenarios with different driving forces can 
exhibit similar emissions and scenarios with similar driving forces can exhibit different 
emissions.  The SRES were designed to “be transparent” and “reproducible” (2000 p25).  
However, the relationship between alternative driving force assumptions and projected 
emissions is far from clear.  The SRES recognises that there is a need for the “main driving 
forces, and underlying assumptions” to “be made widely available” (p47).  Until this is 
completed it is difficult to critically assess the usefulness of the SRES emission projections.  
Many of the underlying assumptions and methods used in the SRES have been criticised (see, 
for example, Castles and Henderson (2003a, 2003b)).  Some of these issues have been 
discussed in the preceding sections. 
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Figures 9 and 10 contain PPP adjusted data sourced from Maddison (2003) and 
exchange rate adjusted data from the SRES.  Maddison’s GDP PPPs are calculated using the 
GK method of aggregation.  These estimates are used because Maddison’s data are quoted 
within the SRES (and are therefore well-known to the SRES authors) and because they 
provide the comprehensive country coverage needed to undertake comparisons with the 
SRES regions.   
  Figure 9 compares the historic income per capita growth rates presented in the SRES 
with growth rates calculated on a PPP basis.  The historical growth rates used in the SRES are 
considerably different to Maddison’s estimates for the REF and ASIA regions.   
Figure 10 compares the regional income per capita ratios used in the SRES with 
estimates based on Maddison’s data set.  Income per capita in each of the three regions is 
compared to the income per capita level in the OECD90 region in 1990.  The SRES data 
substantially overstates the level of inequality for all three regions. 
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Figure 9: Income Per Capita Growth Rates (% per year) 1950-1990 
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 These comparisons are important because they illustrate the magnitude of the 
difference between PPP based and MER based estimates of output and economic growth. As 
is set out in the UN’s System of National Accounts (the professional standard for national 
accounting) when the objective is to compare the volume of goods and services produced 
between countries, PPP conversions and not market exchange rates should be used.  
 
a. Convergence and Economic Growth in the SRES 
 
The SRES represents, in part, the IPCC’s response to the evaluation of its previous 
scenario exercise undertaken in 1992, the IPCC IS92 Emissions Scenarios.  The evaluation 
Figure 10: Income per Capita, Ratio of OECD90 to Other Countries 
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Source: SRES Table 4-6 (the midpoint of the range is used), Maddison (2003) 
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recommended changes to a number of the key assumptions regarding the driving forces of 
future emissions.  In particular, it was suggested that the impact of convergence in income 
levels between developed and developing countries be considered.  As a consequence, 
convergence in income per capita levels represents one of the driving forces in the SRES and 
is a major theme of the SRES scenario analysis. 
As outlined in the previous section explicit convergence assumptions characterise the 
SRES A1 and B1 scenario families. For this reason we focus on these scenarios and, in 
particular, the marker scenarios from these families. 
Whilst convergence in income per capita is a central theme of the A1 and B1 scenario 
families, the convergence assumptions that characterise the SRES scenarios do not appear to 
be limited to income per capita.  The SRES report uses the terms “economic convergence” 
and “convergent world” in describing the A1 and B1 storylines and the B1 family includes 
technology convergence, economic structure convergence, and education convergence 
assumptions.  SRES assumes a negative relationship between income per capita and final 
energy intensities and, as with income per capita, energy intensities are assumed to converge 
in the A1 and B1 scenarios.   
The SRES does not provide an explicit description of the convergence models used 
in the A1 and B1 scenarios.  The only way to examine the convergence assumptions is to 
analyse the historical and projected growth rates that appear in the report. Table 3 summarises 
the historic economic and income per capita growth rates used in the SRES and the projected 
growth rates for the A1 and B1 marker scenarios.  Table 4 contains historical and projected 
income per capita ratios across the SRES regions for the A1 and B1 market scenarios.   
The information in Table 4 illustrates the convergence assumptions that characterise 
the A1 and B1 families.  The ratio of the poorest region in 1990 (ASIA) to the richest region 
(OECD90) is projected to increase from 0.02-0.03 to 0.66 in the A1 marker scenario and to 
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0.45 in the B1 market scenario over the period 1990 to 2100.  In the A1 marker scenario the 
catch-up is a byproduct of “rapid economic development and fast demographic transition” 
(2000, p197).  In the B1 marker scenario, the reduction in income inequalities is due to 
“constant domestic and international efforts” (2000, p200). 
Table 3: SRES Growth Rates 
 1950-1990 1990-2050 1990-2100 
  A1 B1 A1 B1 
Economic Growth Rates (% per year) 
OECD90 3.9 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.5 
REF 4.8 4.1 3.1 3.1 2.7 
IND 3.9 2.2 1.9 2.0 1.6 
ASIA 6.4 6.2 5.5 4.5 3.9 
ALM 4.0 5.5 5.0 4.1 3.7 
DEV 4.8 5.9 5.2 4.3 3.8 
WORLD 4.0 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.5 
    
Income Per Capita Growth Rates (% per year) 
OECD90 2.8 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.2 
REF 3.7 4.0 3.0 3.3 2.8 
IND 2.9 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.5 
ASIA 4.4 5.5 4.8 4.4 3.9 
ALM 1.6 4.0 3.5 3.3 3.0 
DEV 2.7 4.9 4.2 4.0 3.5 
WORLD 2.2 2.8 2.3 2.7 2.2 
Source: SRES Tables 4-5, 4-7. 
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Table 4: SRES Income Per Capita Ratios (Ratio to OECD90) 
 1990 2050 2100 
  A1 B1 A1 B1 
OECD90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
REF 0.11-0.15 0.58 0.29 0.92 0.65 
ASIA 0.02-0.03 0.30 0.18 0.66 0.45 
ALM 0.06-0.12 0.35 0.27 0.56 0.56 
      
DEV/IND 0.05-0.08 0.36 0.28 0.62 0.55 
      
Source: SRES Table 4-6 
The SRES appears to consider a situation in which steady states across countries are 
converging so that the distinction between conditional and unconditional convergence 
disappears.  As argued above, whilst there is a large body of literature in support of the 
existence of various forms of conditional convergence there is little evidence of unconditional 
aggregate convergence.  Even if steady state characteristics across countries were to converge, 
the empirical literature suggests that the rate of convergence in income per capita would be 
very slow.  The SRES authors acknowledge that “it may well take a century (given all other 
factors set favourably) for a poor country to catch-up to levels that prevail in the industrial 
countries today, never mind the levels that might prevail in affluent countries 100 years in the 
future” (p 123). 
 
5. Some Illustrative Implications of The Alternative Approaches 
 
a. Effect of lower GDP growth in the SRES 
 
Castles and Henderson (2003a, 2003b) suggest that if PPP adjusted data were used in 
the SRES, the projected economic growth rates would be lower and so would the projections 
of emission levels.  
  
49
An examination of the effect on emission projections of changing the economic 
growth assumptions in the SRES requires knowledge of the assumed relationship between 
economic growth and emissions in the SRES scenarios.  This information is not provided in 
the SRES.  The authors of the SRES argue that the relationship between economic growth 
and emissions is complex and involves the (endogenous) interrelationships between 
economic growth, population changes, and changes in emissions intensity.  
Consider the following equation know as the IPAT identity (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1972): 
Impact  = Population × Affluence ×  Technology 
 which can be expressed as  
Emissions = Population × GDP per capita × Emissions per GDP 
E     =          P         ×       GDPPC        ×             I    (Emissions Intensity) 
If population growth (p), GDP per capita growth (gdppc) and growth in emissions 
intensity (i) are independent then the IPAT identity can be approximated by a linear 
expression in growth rates: 
e = p + gdppc + i 
and changes in income per capita growth would result in corresponding changes in emissions 
growth. While this relationship appears to indicate that GDP should move with emissions, it 
is, in fact, quite misleading. Emissions intensity and GDP are closely related, particulalrly 
because the drivers of GDP growth may themselves be the same factors that drive changes in 
emissions intensity. 
With endogenous right hand side variables, the relationship between changes in 
income per capita growth and emissions growth becomes more complicated. 
We can examine the factors determining emission intensity, and the relationship 
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between emissions and GDP by considering a simple CES production model. Assume that 
aggregate output is a CES function of energy (E) and other factors (O, which would include 
labour and capital). Let PE be the price of energy and let PO be the price of other inputs. 
Further, assume that energy is itself a CES composite of an emitting technology (EM) and a 
non emitting technology (NE). Let PEM be the price of the emitting energy source and PNE be 
the price of the non emitting source. With appropriate choice of parameters, this simple setup 
could represent a variety of styles of models. 
Expressing variables in percentage changes (and ignoring any changes in population), 
we can write: 
emis = gdp  +  pEM (σ1SEM(SE – 1) – σ2 (1 – SEM )) 
 +  pNE (σ1SNE(SE – 1) – σ2 (SNE )) 
 +  σ1SOpO (5.1) 
where σ1 is the elasticity of substitution between the energy bundle and other inputs; 
σ2 is the elasticity of substitution between energy types; SE is the share of energy in total 
output; SO is the share of other inputs in total output; SEM is the share of emitting energy in 
total energy and SNE is the share of non emitting energy in total energy. 
Equation (5.1) shows that the change in emissions depends on the change in GDP 
plus three other terms which together define emissions intensity. Emissions intensity depends 
on the changes in the relative prices of energy and non-energy inputs, and emitting and non-
emitting energy sources as well as on the ability to substitute between these inputs (and their 
relative shares in production). Emissions intensity could increase or decline depending on 
these factors. 
Relative input and energy prices will change as a result of the changes in the drivers 
of growth. For example, productivity improvements in non emitting energy will lead to a 
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decline in its relative price, affecting its use and subsequently emissions intensity. 
It is possible for emissions and GDP to move in opposite directions, that is for GDP 
to increase and for emissions to decline (or vice versa). Put another way, is it possible for 
changes in emissions intensity to offset changes in GDP in determining emissions? 
To address this question, we need to close equation (5.1) so as to relate changes in 
GDP to changes in price of inputs (or equivalently, to changes in the productivity of inputs). 
We can close it by assuming a crude reduced form GDP response where GDP is a function of 
the price of all inputs. This response represents the net effect of changes in labour and capital 
inputs that result from changes in the productivity of the underlying factors of production. 
With this assumption (5.1) becomes: 
emis =   γ(SOpO + SESEMpEM + SESNEpNE) 
 +  pEM (σ1SEM(SE – 1) – σ2 (1 – SEM )) 
 +  pNE (σ1SNE(SE – 1) – σ2 (SNE )) 
 +  σ1SOpO (5.2) 
where γ (<0) is a parameter capturing the response of GDP to changes in productivity 
(represented as prices here). 
Equation (5.2) shows that the change in emissions depends on the relationship 
between the drivers of growth (here represented as the prices of different inputs), the 
substitution relationships and the overall expansions parameter. With appropriate parameters 
settings, and exogenous changes in prices, it is possible for emissions and GDP to move in 
opposite directions. How likely is this, or put another way, for randomly chosen parameter 
sets, how many of them result in GDP and emissions moving in opposite directions? 
In order to check the likelihood of GDP and emissions moving in different directions, 
we calibrate the simple model above using data from G-Cubed simulate it for a variety of 
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parameter settings. One set of results are set out in figure 11 which plots the likelihood of 
emissions and GDP moving in opposite directions against the relative importance of non 
emitting energy productivity changes as a source of growth. 
Figure 11: Growth, GDP and emissions
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Figure 11 shows that as the relative importance of non-emitting energy productivity 
improvements as a source of growth increases, the probability that any given parameter set 
will lead to emissions and GDP moving in opposite directions increases. Thus, the more 
important clean technology is as a driver of growth, the more likely it is that there will be a 
parameter set that will cause GDP and emissions to move in opposite directions. 
This discussion illustrates three important points. First, understanding the 
relationship between GDP and emissions requires breaking down the sources of growth and 
the sources of changes in emissions intensity. Second, while this may be complex in some 
cases, it is possible to construct back of the envelope models that draw out the key factors. 
We have used a simple CES model here, but simple versions of more flexible functional 
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forms could be used to represent a wide variety of models. Third, because the relationship 
between emissions and GDP depends on the sources of growth, it is quite likely that this 
relationship will differ for the different SRES scenarios. 
 
b. PPP versus MER in G-Cubed: an illustration 
 
 We now use the G-Cubed model to explore how large the difference between using 
MER versus PPP initial income levels for emissions over a century.  We solve the G-Cubed 
model under our conventional assumptions of the gaps in productivity growth being related to 
the overall PPP gaps. We then regenerate the productivity projection by changing the initial 
gaps for China and LDCs in the model to be based on MER measures of GDP per capital. 
This implies that we move from gaps of China from 0.2 of the United States to 0.1 of the 
United States and for developing economies from 0.4 of the United States to 0.13 of the 
Unites States. That is, for China, the gap relative to the US doubles under the MER approach 
and for developing economies, the gap more than triples.  
 The results for the difference in emissions in the MER case versus the PPP case are 
shown in Figure 11. By 2050 we find that the G-Cubed model produces 21% more emissions 
than the PPP approach when we base our growth rates on the MER initial conditions. By 
2100 this is 40% higher emissions. The impacts on cumulative emissions would be less than 
this and on temperatures (which depend on cumulative emissions) even less. Nonetheless this 
is more than 3 times the overestimate found by Manne and Richels (2003). The higher 
emissions are due to higher emissions in LDCs and China due to higher growth but also due 
to higher emissions in industrial economies. Stronger growth and a higher marginal product 
of capital implies that industrial countries sell more to developing countries as well as 
receiving a higher return on capital invested in these economies. Both of these effects raise 
emissions and levels of income in non developing economies. 
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 Based on these estimates from the G-Cubed model it seems that the assumptions 
about the initial levels of income based on MER versus PPP measures are very important for 
estimates of future carbon emissions. This is a consequence of the particular assumptions we 
adopt with regards to the convergence model. 
  
 
Figure 12: Change in Carbon Emissions Market vs PPP
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6. Storylines versus probabilities 
 
As noted above, the SRES develops a number of different storylines for its analysis, 
but does not make any judgement about the likelihood of any of these storylines. An 
important alternative to this approach is to try do develop explicit probability distributions 
for the key outcomes (such as emissions) from the projections exercise. Such an approach 
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would attach an explicit probability distribution to key model input variables and then use 
a range of techniques (Monte Carlo analysis, for example) to propagate this uncertainty 
throughout the model. The result would be a probability distribution for key output 
variables. 
Grubler and Nakicenovic (2001) reject this sort of approach because in their view 
‘probability in the natural sciences is a statistical approach relying on repeated 
experiments and frequencies of measured outcomes ….Scenarios describing possible 
future developments in society, economy, technology, policy and so on are radically 
different’ (p.15). 
But as Pittock, Jones and Mitchell (2001) point out ‘this frequentist basis for 
probabilities in predictions of an unknown future is not possible in the earth sciences 
either, since there will be only one real outcome which cannot be measured now’ (p 249). 
Rather, uncertainty analysis in economics and earth sciences requires not a 
frequentist but a Bayesian approach in which prior assessments of the probability of key 
input variables are put into an appropriate modelling framework (see the discussion in 
Malakoff, 1999). 
There are a number of possible sources for these prior probability distributions. In 
terms of key model parameters, they could come from the statistical estimations of the 
parameters themselves. Alternatively, they could be constructed so as to reflect expert 
judgements of a particular issue. (This sort of analysis has been used to excellent effect by 
Nordhaus, 1994, and the various techniques used are described in detail in Morgan and 
Henrion, 1990). 
Whatever the source, uncertainty analysis within a particular modelling framework 
gives powerful insights into the sources of uncertainty in the model and the drivers of 
particular modelling results. This insight is unfortunately lacking in the SRES results as 
presented. It is impossible to tell from the SRES what a small change in assumptions 
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means for the results. 
Importantly, probability distributions for emissions could be used as an input into 
subsequent climate analysis (as undertaken, for example, by Wigley and Raper 2001) to 
ultimately derive a probability distribution for temperature changes. Such a distribution 
would be extremely valuable for policy makers, and would assist in planning and policy 
development. The work by Webster et al. (2003) is an excellent example of how 
uncertainty analysis can be used in a combined economic and earth systems model. By 
explicitly modeling uncertainty in emissions as well as other climate factors, they derive 
an explicit probability distribution for temperature change. 
While the probability distributions developed in this way may be imperfect in many 
regards, it has the advantage of being explicitly derived, with known assumptions that can 
be tested and challenged. The problem with the current SRES results is that policy makers 
inevitably overlay their own implicit distributions, which may well be based on political 
rather than scientific considerations. 
 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion  
 
Projecting the world economy over long time horizons is challenging. One only has 
to consider the problems that would have been encountered in 1900 in projecting carbon 
emissions in the year 2000. Indeed it would have been difficult in 1970 to do well in 
predicting 2000, given the important structural break in many economic and energy 
variables resulting from the OPEC oil price shocks. Nonetheless it is important to use the 
best methodology available to attempt to gain some idea about where carbon emissions 
might be heading. The mistake would be to rely on the accuracy of these projections for 
the efficacy of the policy responses that might follow from the predictions. Given the 
enormous uncertainties in this type of prediction exercise, the policy responses should 
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deal with the uncertainties and the need for flexible responses rather than fixed targets 
based on projected outcomes10. 
We have outlined the key issues that need to be considered in undertaking long run 
emissions projections from an economic point of view. Other researchers with an energy 
or engineering background would tend to focus on technologies rather than economic 
drivers of growth. Of course, the two are interrelated and poorly understood in practice 
and there is room for a variety of approaches in the debate. Nonetheless it is important to 
use best practice when undertaking such a complex task.  
In this paper we have illustrated how projections of global economic activity and 
emissions are undertaken with the G-Cubed multi-country model and how imprecise 
relationships between economic growth and carbon emissions can be depending on the 
source of that growth. We have also presented our understanding of the approach in the 
body of research in the IPCC SRES scenarios. There are a number of differences between 
the approaches taken in the SRES and the approach we take using the G-Cubed model. 
These range from the role of economic growth to the implications of technology, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements and structural change in understanding 
future emissions. 
We can summarise our findings with the following observations. 
• Projecting emissions requires projecting the levels of activities that produce those 
emissions. For emissions from fossil fuel combustion, this essentially means 
projecting energy use within the economy as well as projecting the way in which 
that energy will be generated. 
• Both the level of GDP growth, and the relationship between GDP and emissions, 
will depend on the composition of growth, and the relative importance of the 
                                             
10 See McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002)  for a long discussion of the range of uncertainties in climate change. 
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various drivers of economic growth. There is no single aggregate relationship 
between GDP and emissions, and there is also no single simple measure of AEEI 
that would mediate between GDP and emissions. 
• Rather, the level of emissions depends on the composition of growth. Projecting 
emissions therefore requires at the least a model that distinguishes between 
sectors within an economy. 
• Within the G-Cubed framework that we use here, the fundamental drivers of 
growth are population growth and technical change, where this technical change 
is to be understood at the sectoral level. While there are many ways of projecting 
technical change at the sectoral level, the default approach that we use with G-
Cubed is a variant of a convergence model. Here convergence is not in terms of 
GDP per capita or some exogenously specified income measure, but in terms of 
technical efficiency in input use. What happens to GDP per capita is an 
endogenous outcome, and may or may not involve convergence. 
• In our default approach we specify convergence to the US, which is modeled as 
being on the frontier. We use real income differences (expressed in PPP terms) to 
define the initial gap between other countries and the US.  
• To explore some implications of what has become known as the Castles and 
Henderson critique of the SRES, we have looked at the effect of using market 
exchange rate (MER) income comparisons rather than PPP comparisons to define 
the initial gap in the G-Cubed model. Using MER instead of PPP measures of 
initial GDP differences across countries results in total emissions 20% higher by 
2050, and 40% higher 2100, than in the case of the PPP measure.  
• The properties of the model are unaffected by whether base year of the model is 
in PPP or MER units, but the projections of productivity growth are very 
different if the rate of convergence is assumed to be the empirically measured 
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rate. The difference in emissions under the two approaches implies a significant 
overestimate of emissions in using MER measures of GDP.  
• This PPP issue arises because we have chosen to construct our convergence 
model in a particular way. In this context, PPP is the appropriate base to use for 
real income comparisons between countries. While this is true in the context of 
G-Cubed, we cannot say how it applies to other models. 
• A PPP issue does not inevitably arise in projecting emissions, however. First, it is 
possible to drive projections without using any form of convergence modelling. 
Convergence is, however, a powerful assumption. Indeed conditional 
convergence has strong empirical support for some countries. Second, using a 
convergence model at the sectoral level it is possible to avoid real income 
comparisons by focussing on productivity comparisons which can be defined in 
quantity terms using original country data. This approach is considerably more 
data intensive but also potentially very powerful. 
• While in G-Cubed we find that lowering growth results in lower emissions, this 
result does not necessarily apply to other models and other scenarios. It is not 
difficult to construct a model in which emissions and GDP move in opposite 
directions, which appears to be the case for some of the SRES scenarios. 
• While the PPP critique raises issues of good statistical practice, a far more 
fundamental issue for emissions projections is the underlying nature of the model 
used to project productivity changes. This is an area with enormous research 
potential. 
• Finally, we note that in sharp contrast to the approach to uncertainty taken by the 
SRES, it is possible to get a very good grip on the uncertainties and sensitivities 
(arising from both parameter and scenario uncertainty) using Bayesian inspired 
simulation analysis. We think it is much better to give policy makers a considered 
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and transparent probability distribution than to rely on them to derive their own. 
 
A key issue facing policy makers is how to interpret the projections of the SRES in 
the light of the various critiques that it has faced. On the basis of our methodological 
discussion in this paper, we offer the following observations. 
First, it is crucial to understand the drivers of emissions projections and their 
sensitivity to changes in key assumptions. While this understanding cannot be gleaned 
from the SRES in its current form, there is no reason why the various SRES models could 
not be explored to further understand these sensitivities. 
Second, as we have argued, a broad range of projections without any sense of 
likelihood is of limited use to policy makers. Indeed, it is potentially misleading as it can 
lead to researchers applying the upper bound as the most likely scenario. Currently there 
is no basis for such a choice and work is needed to further understand the likelihood of 
different projections.  
It should be possible to increase understanding of both these issues even if the 
underlying SRES scenarios remain unchanged. 
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